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The usually assumed two categories of costs involved in climate change policy analysis, 
namely abatement and damage costs, hide the presence of a third category, namely adaptation 
costs. This dodges the determination of an appropriate level for them. Including adaptation 
costs explicitly in the total environmental cost function allows one to characterize the optimal 
(cost minimizing) balance between the three categories, in statics as well as in dynamics. 
Implications are derived for cost benefit analysis of adaptation expenditures. 
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1  A classical model  
  The  simplest  and  most  standard  form  of  modeling  that  serves  as  a  basis  for  the 





Ji = ci(ei)+ di(ΔT) where ΔT = F(e1,...,ei,...,en)   i = 1,…,n.  (1) 
In this model (called hereafter the “c+d model”), 
•  the index i denotes all countries of the world,  
•  the variables ei  ≥ 0 are the countries’ flows of emissions of CO2 “greenhouse gas”,  
•  and 
￿ 
ΔT is the resulting world temperature change from some initial date, say 1800; 
•  the transfer function
4 F( . ) (assumed increasing) describes the highly complex process 
whereby  greenhouse  gas  emissions  induce  temperature  increases  all  around  the 
globe, 
•  ci(ei) is a function (assumed decreasing and convex) describing the cost to country i of 
its abatement decisions, that is, of reducing  its emissions , also called “mitigation”,  
•  di(ΔT)  is  a  function  (increasing  and  strictly
5  convex)  that  denotes  the  cost  of  the 
damages incurred by country i as a result of temperature change ,  
•  and finally Ji is the overall environmental cost borne by country i, adding up abatement 
and damage costs. All costs are measured in € per unit of time and all functions 
assumed to be differentiable. 
 
  When  working  with  this  standard  model  of  multilateral  externality
6  due  to  the 
phenomenon described by the function F(.), the literature
7 considers two alternative patterns 
of behavior of the countries: in the first one, each country behaves so as to minimize its 
overall environmental cost 
￿ 
Ji just defined by choosing in isolation emissions  ei , and taking 
                                                      
3 It was formulated first by MÄLER 1989, in a slightly different form because the application was to 
the acid rains problem. 
4 While the simplified expression above prevents one to understand the details of that transformation, 
the stated function is sufficient to evoke the fact of the by now universally recognized influence of 
anthropogenic CO2  emissions (and accumulation – more on this below) on temperature change.  
5 By assuming linear damage cost curves with intercept at zero, STERN 2007 (p459) precludes the 
analysis developed in this paper. 
6 Also to be characterized as a “global public good” due to the diffuse (as opposed to directional) 
nature of the way it occurs 
7 A non technical presentation of which is offered in EYCKMANS and TULKENS 2005.      
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as given the emissions  ej  of the other countries: a Nash type of behavior. According to the 
second pattern, the countries choose jointly emissions  e
*
i so as to minimize 
￿ 
Ji i=1
n ∑ , that is, 
the  sum  of  the  countries’  overall  costs,  and  thus  internalizing  at  the  world  level  the 
multilateral externality occurring : a Paretian behavior.  
 
  In either case, a balance is struck between the costs of mitigation ci(ei) and the costs of 
damages di(ΔT), which is easily obtained from the first order conditions of the maximization 
problems involved in the two alternative patterns of behavior. In the class-room simplifying 
case of a linear additive form ΔT = ei i=1
n ∑  of the transfer function F(.), these conditions look 
as follows: 
— the Nash equilibrium is a vector (e1,...,en,ΔT)such that  
    ′ ci(ei) = ′ di(ΔT), i=1,…,n, 
or, in words, such that in each country abatement be pushed and damages be incurred up 
to the point where marginal abatement cost equals the domestic marginal damage cost, 
while 
— Pareto efficiency is a vector (e1
∗,...,en
∗,ΔT
*) such that 
    ′ ci(e
*
i) = ′ dj(ΔT
*)
j=1
n ∑ , i=1,…,n, 
or, in words, such that abatement be pushed and damages be incurred up to the point 
where in each country marginal abatement cost equals the sum over all countries of their 
domestic marginal damage costs. 
 
In summary, these conditions identify alternative levels for the mitigation activities, based on 
the damages they allow to avoid. 
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2  Introducing adaptation  
  There  is  an  important  difference  in  nature  between  the  two  categories  of  costs 
involved: while abatement costs are “out of pocket” expenditures resulting from voluntary 
decisions  to  abate,  damage  costs  are  rather  incurred  in  terms  of  lost  values,  most  often 
undergone involuntarily, and not resulting from expenditure decisions.  
  In this interpretation, the option of adaptation is not explicitly brought up, and some 
authors assert that it need not be because adaptation can be considered as implicit in the 
damage functions di (.). These should be seen, they argue, as net of adaptation expenditures. 
Yet, this eschews the issue of what is an appropriate level of adaptation, an important issue 
because adaptation activities are not free. Indeed, they entail out of pocket costs of their own, 
which  vary  with  their  size.  On  the  other  hand,  what  is  the  economic  justification  for 
adaptation expenditures? It essentially lies in their contribution to reducing the damages 
incurred or their cost, either by avoiding the physical damages or by circumventing their 
effects thanks to protection from their impacts.  
  Now, these adaptation costs can possibly be higher or lower than the damage cost 
reductions they are meant to achieve. They would obviously be justified only in the latter 
case, but to what extent? In this note, we provide an answer to that question, taking account 
of its effect on the countries’ overall environmental costs stated above.  
 
  Adaptation is made explicit in the c+d model by:  
(i)  Specifying in terms of an aggregate magnitude that we denote by αi ≥ 0 the physical
8 
activities  whereby  a  country  i  seeks  to  protect  itself  against  the  effects  of  global 
warming and by having them appear as the argument of an additional cost function 
ai(αi), increasing, that accounts for the adaptation expenditures made in country i. 
(ii)  Introducing αi as an additional argument in the function di to make it read di(ΔT,αi), 
with  the  assumed  properties  that  for  every  ΔT, 
￿ 







∂di /∂ΔT > 0,∂
2di /∂ΔT
2 > 0. The costs accounted for with this function 
do not include adaptation costs anymore, since these have just been stated separately 
with ai(αi).  They are only costs incurred from damages undergone involuntarily as 
suggested above, for short “suffered damage costs” - see below). The two derivatives 
with respect to 
￿ 
αi imply respectively that more adaptation reduces not only the total 
                                                      
8 This specification excludes what TOL 2005 calls “facilitative adaptation”, the modeling of which 
requires a more general model of the economy.      
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suffered costs incurred (graphically in the €-ΔT space, a shift downward of the whole 
curve) but also the marginal such costs (i.e. a reduction in the slope of the curve)
9. 
  We then have three sources of costs, and these lead us to modify the usual expression 




Ji = ci(ei)+ ai(αi)+ di(ΔT, αi) where ΔT = F(e1,...,ei,...,en).  (2) 
These three sources of costs are precisely those that come to the mind of an economist when 
reading, as in our title: “Civilization has only three options: mitigation (…), adaptation (…) and 
suffering  (…)”.  With  this  trilogy  John  Holdren  (2008,  p.  430)  compactly  and  beautifully 
summarizes what can be done in the face of climate change.  
  He pursues with what I read as a direct challenge to economists that we hardly can 
leave unanswered: “We are already doing some of each and will do more of all but what the mix will 
be depends on choices that society will make going forward”.  Within the above framework and 
with  the  help  of  some  economic  theory  we  feel  we  can  enlighten  these  choices  in  the 
direction of what should be done or, in other terms, what would be the “right” mix. One way 
to do that in the c+d framework is to abandon the ambiguous “damage cost” terminology 
used for di(ΔT) in the function (1), split the function instead into the two components of 
“adaptation cost” ai(αi) and “suffered damage cost”
10 di(ΔT,αi) and approach in those terms 
the right mix question. 
 
3   Optimal adaptation 
Notice first the two opposing roles played by the adaptation variable αi in the second 
and third terms of the new overall cost function (2): increasing and decreasing, respectively. 
This  suggests  that  when  we  introduce  adaptation  in  the  minimization,  a  balance  is  also 
struck  between  these  two  aspects  of  it.  More  precisely,  the  first  order  condition  for  a 
minimum of Ji with respect to αi is that it satisfies 
  dai / dαi + ∂di(ΔT,αi)/∂αi = 0.  (3) 
In words: 
                                                      
9 The justification of this second property will appear below as a condition for α to be positive at an 
optimum.
 
10  We  think  this  Holdren  inspired  expression  better  reflects  the  reality  at  stake  than  the  one  of 
“residual” damage cost, used e.g. by TOL 2005 as well as STERN 2007 and DE BRUIN, DELLINCK 
and TOL 2007.      
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Proposition 1 : Adaptation is achieved optimally in a country if it is pushed up to a level where the 
cost to the country of more adaptation becomes equal to the value of the suffered costs thereby avoided. 
  Beyond  its  apparent  banality,  notice  the  following  properties  of  the  rule  so 
established: 
(i)  Condition (3) holds for both Nash and Paretian behaviors, since they both result from 
some form of global cost minimization.  
(ii) The  rule  applies  to  each  country  separately:  the  optimality  condition  is  a  purely 
domestic  one.  There  is  neither  an  international  externality  nor  a  global  public 
good involved 
11.  
(iii)  The condition holds true for any level of ΔT. 
(iv)  The condition is independent of the abatement policy ei of country i, but it varies 
with the state ΔT of the environment. 
Of  course,  properties  (i),  (iii)  and  (iv)  do  not  imply  that  the  total  amount  of  optimal 
adaptation  expenditure  is  the  same  in  the  various  occurrences  where  the  marginal 
occurrences hold. 
While properties (ii) and (iv) are in agreement with two of TOL’s 2005 propositions, 
our  setting  does  not  support  his  presentation  of  adaptation  and  mitigation  as  “policy 
substitutes”, subject to some kind of “trade-off”.  This view indeed derives from reasoning at 
constant total environmental cost Ji and keeping ΔT constant.  But when ΔT is taken to vary, say 
to increase, adaptation and mitigation expenditures contribute together to the increase in total 
cost, and especially to its minimization if (3) keeps being satisfied.  
Aside from this question of terminology,  let us focus our interest on what the rule 
allows one to say conceptually, and to do in practice, when it is not satisfied in one or several 
countries. We consider first some conceptual developments.   
 
4   An « optimally adapted » damage cost function 
Let αι* be the amount of adaptation activities that satisfies the minimization condition 
(3) for some country i. Unless di(ΔT, αi) is separable, this magnitude is likely to vary as a 
                                                      
11 Unless, of course, an adaptation activity carried out in one country has spillover effects in one of 
several neighboring ones. This can be accommodated in condition (3) in a fairly straightforward way, 
but entails amendments in the reasoning that follow.      
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function of ΔT. It should therefore rather be written as αi*(ΔT). As a result, the second and 
third terms of (2) may be seen as a function of ΔΤ  only and read together as 
  hi*(ΔT) = ai(αi*(ΔT)) +  di(ΔT, αi*(ΔT))  (4) 
with the asterisk reminding one that adaptation is optimal at any point along the function. 
We shall call hi*(ΔT) country i’s “optimally adapted” damage cost function.  
 
Graphically  (Figure  1),  the  function h i*(ΔT)  appears  as  an  envelope  of  a  family  of 
suffered damage cost functions di(ΔT,αi) as defined earlier. In the space (€,ΔT), the graphs of 
these functions differ from one another according to the amount of adaptation expenditure 
and level of these activities ai(αi) chosen by the country. Formally, the difference between 
these functions results from a difference in costs that are fixed with respect to ΔΤ.  This is 
similar to differences between  alternative short run cost functions enveloped by the long run 
one in standard microeconomics. This analogy is pursued further by noticing that with every 
(fixed)  adaptation  expenditure  ai(αi)    there  is  logically  associated  a  specific  suffered  cost 
function di(ΔT, αi), variable with ΔΤ and where αI is a parameter. Hence, for any given ΔΤ  
the optimal adaptation expenditure is the one whose associated suffering cost  function is 
tangent, at the point ΔΤ , to the envelope of all possible suffering cost functions.  
 
 
Figure 1  Two suffered damage cost functions “enveloped” by an optimally adapted damage cost function 
 
From the tangency points in this diagram there emerges an interesting property: for any 
given level of temperature change, say ΔT1, the optimal adaptation expenditure ai(αi*(ΔT1) is 






€  hi*(ΔT)      
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.  (5) 
 
In words,  
Proposition 2 : The marginal adapted damage cost entailed by temperature change is equal to the 
marginal suffering costs only and does not include costs of adaptation.  
 
This results from taking into account the optimality condition (3) on α in the specification of 
the marginal adapted damage cost which is derived from (4). Indeed, and more explicitly, from 
this condition one has (dropping momentarily the arguments of the functions, to alleviate, as 


















































Figure 2   Two suffered damage cost functions di(ai, ΔT) with non optimal adaptation for target ΔT1 
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In the presentation of Figure 2, non optimal adaptation is illustrated in the following 
way.  Taking  ΔT1  as  a  target  or  alternatively  as  the  prevailing  situation,  that  is,  as  the 
temperature change to be achieved or actually occurring, if adaptation expenditure ai is equal 
to ai(αi*(z1), then  country i adapts too little, the excess cost (of suffering) being AC at the 
target. A hint of this is given by the fact that at C, whose abscissa is the target, the marginal 
suffering cost is higher than what it would be if adaptation were larger. Therefore, adapting 
more costs less than the suffering cost it saves. Alternatively, if ai is equal to ai(αi*(z2), country i 
adapts too much, the excess cost at the target being BC at the target. Here, a sign of excess 
adaptation is that at the target the additional suffering cost from adapting less is of lower 
value than the savings made from reducing adaptation activities.  
 
5   The right mix — Static case 
  Going back now to our initial query of identifying the “right” amounts of mitigation, 
adaptation and suffering, let us reconsider it in the light of what we have developed so far. 
Everything is now driven by the newly defined overall environmental cost function (2). With 
optimal adaptation α
*
i it reads: 
￿ 
Ji
∗ = ci(ei)+ ai(αi
∗(ΔT))+ di(ΔT, αi
∗(ΔT)) 
=  ci(ei)  +   hi*(ΔT) 
and  may  be  called  the  optimally  adapted  overall  environmental  cost  function.  Its  further 
minimization with respect to mitigation (ei), and temperature change (ΔT) yields the right mix 
in the following terms: 
— In the case of the Nash equilibrium, a vector (e1,...,en,α1,...,αn,ΔT) such that for every i,  
 











and      
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**) such that for 
every i,  



























In words, we have 
 
Proposition 3 : The right mix of mitigation, adaptation and suffering is the one such that in all 
countries: 
— marginal emissions abatement cost be equal to marginal suffering cost entailed by temperature 
change (domestic or global, according to the behavior considered), and 
— marginal adaptation cost be equal to marginal domestic suffering cost avoided thanks to such 
adaptation. 
 
6.   Adaptation over time: investment and the optimal stock of adaptation equipment 
The  preceding  analysis  is  entirely  formulated  in  static  terms,  which  means  that  all 
variables represent flows per unit of time. However, most examples of adaptation activities 
that come to mind imply investments in infrastructural equipments such as, for instance, 
dikes to protect against sea level rise. It is therefore essential to show whether and how the 
analysis can be extended to a dynamic context involving investment in protective physical 
capital of all kinds. 
To proceed in this way, let us think in discrete time, with unit periods denoted t = 
1,2,… . The climatic change ΔΤt  that takes place at time t entails at that moment suffered 
damages for country i whose value is dit , expressed in €/time unit. The adaptation activities, 
which allow to attenuate these damages can take various forms. Some are “ephemeral” in the      
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sense that they only reduce dit at time t itself, whereas other ones are durable and exert their 
protective  effects  over  several  time  periods.  In  the  first  case,  the  protective  activities  are 
flows, and we denote them αit , whereas in the second case, they consist in accumulating in 
country i 
12 a stock of protective equipments — in fact, a capital  — whose amount at time t 
we denote Bit . Its durability over time is expressed by specifying : 
 
￿ 
Bit = Bit−1(1−δβ)+ βit  (6) 
where βit  is the addition made to the stock at time t and δβ is the depreciation rate of the 
stock  during  period  t. The  value  of  this  last  parameter  varies  of  course  according  to  the 
nature of the equipments involved, as well as with their life time. Here, we limit ourselves to 
a reasoning in aggregate terms, without ignoring that a disaggregate formulation, in terms of 
projects, is necessary for making policy relevant proposals. Our last section will go in that 
direction. 
Let  us  denote  by  bi(βit)  the  expenditure  entailed  in  country  i  by  the  addition  βit  of 
protective equipments at time t. As far as the suffered damages are concerned, the existing 
stock of protective equipment now enters the damage cost function di , next to the flow of 
ephemeral protective activities, as follows: 
  dit = di(ΔTt, αit, Βit),  (7) 
the function being decreasing in its last two arguments. 
The above leads us to redefine at each period t the overall environmental cost (2) of 
country i as 
  Jit =   ci(eit) + ai(αit) + bi(βit) + di(ΔTt, αit, Βit)  (8) 
where 
￿ 
Bit = Bit−1(1−δβ)+ βit   
and  
￿ 
ΔTt = G(Tt−1,e1t,...,eit,...,ent), 
whose four components represent the four cost categories of mitigation, short term and long 
run adaptation and suffered damages, respectively
13.  
The variable αit — the ephemeral (short term) actions of adaptation — plays, within 
each period t, the same opposite two roles as in the preceding static analysis. One can thus 
similarly define at each t a specific optimally adapted overall environmental cost, that is, a 
cost including ephemeral adaptation expenditures αit* that verify : 
                                                      
12 The qualification mentioned in footnote 7 above applies. 
13 The schematic temperature transfer function is modified here to account for the essentially dynamic 
nature of climate models which involve CO2 accumulation.      
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dai /dαit + ∂di /∂αit = 0, t =1,2,...  .  (9) 
A parallel role is played by the stock of equipments trough the variables involved in 
durable adaptation, namely the level of the stock Bit  and the flow of periodic additions to it 
βit .  While the latter increase expenditures at time t, the former reduces the cost of suffered 
damages:  there  is  thus  a  tradeoff,  like  before.    However,  the  formulation  of  optimality 
conditions is more complex for two reasons. First, the reduction of damages resulting from 
each action βit spreads over several future periods: to account completely for the benefit so 
obtained  the  analysis  must  become  an  intertemporal  one,  identifying  for  projects  or 
equipments decided at time t the reduction in suffered damages occurring at each period τ = 
t,  t+1,  t+2,…  of  their  life  time.  This  brings  about  another  dimension  of  the  issue  under 
consideration, namely that investments in adaptive protection do not necessarily take place 
once and for all, but instead can be realized, and in fact are, in terms of programs extending 
over several time periods. Therefore what is at stake at each t is not just one investment 
decision βit  but rather a sequence of them βit , βit+1, βit+2,… ,βiT  — in other words an investment 
program where T is the horizon planning of the decision maker. 
Optimality in durable adaptation equipments is then to be formulated at each time t 










∑  ai(αiτ) + bi(βiτ) + di(ΔΤt, αiτ , Biτ) ]  (10) 
where 
￿ 
Biτ = Biτ−1(1−δβ)+ βiτ, 
￿ 
ΔT τ = G(T τ−1,e1τ,...,eiτ,...,enτ), 












∗  be the solution to 
(10). The first order conditions that characterize this solution obviously satisfy (9) and also 
imply that at each t the adaptation investment 
￿ 
βit
∗ made at that time in country i satisfies 
 
￿ 





∑ = 0.  (11) 
In words, at any point in time t investment in adaptation is optimal only if at the margin its cost is 
equal to the value discounted at time t of the future suffered damages it will allow to avoid. 




∗ satisfying (9), the overall environmental cost of country i at time t, with both 








∗)  (12)      
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∗(ΔTt) = Bit−1(1−δβ)+ βit
∗ 
  and 
￿ 
ΔTt = G(Tt−1,e1t,...,eit,...,ent).   
Intuitively, and as it was the case with (2), an envelope property links in (12), at each t, the 




the suffered damage function di (.) just shifts its graph upwards or downwards. 
 
7   Conclusion: implications for integrated assessment modeling and cost-benefit analysis . 
  In most static as well as dynamic models, introducing adaptation in the damage cost 
functions leads to expressions such as Ji
* where adaptation is indeed implicit. I derive from 
this, and from the above explicitation of this practice, four implications for future policy 
modeling and decisions. 
 
1°)  In  all  IAMs  (Integrated  Assessment  Models),  the  optimality  condition  on  emissions  is 
always, for each country, the equality of abatement marginal cost with damage  marginal 
cost
14.    Is  that  just  damage  costs  incurred,  or  does  it  include  adaptation  expenditures? 
Equality (5) teaches us that if adaptation is optimal, only undergone suffering costs are to be 
taken into account, without adding anything from adaptation expenditures. This does not 
mean that adaptation expenditure are to be ignored in general, but well, instead, that they 
must  be  handled  “separately”,  taking  good  care  of  whether  their  size  indeed  meets  the  
conditions (3) or (9) — see  3° below. 
2°) Therefore, it should always be examined in detail in all Integrated Assessment models 
whether or not they have included adaptation, as well as whether the amount of expenditure 
for it is an appropriate one. 
3°) Most importantly, condition (3) and intertemporal conditions (9) and (11) for optimal 
adaptation may be considered as a reference to guide the evaluation of investment projects in 
adaptation equipments, as well as the selection among them when they are numerous.  
The method to be followed is essentially the following: for every project under consideration 
at time t, the expenditure it requires may be assimilated to the first term of the equalities (9) 
or  (11),  depending  upon  the  nature  of  the  project  –  a  fairly  easy  task.  By  contrast,  the 
                                                      
14 Domestic in the case of “positive” Nash equilibrium, collective in the case of “normative” Pareto 
efficiency.      
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numerical evaluation of the right hand sides of these equations, for each individual project, is 
a major challenge, although an inescapable one if economic rationality is to prevail in the 
decision to adopt or discard projects. Bundling projects may of course be considered in the 
same spirit.  
The conditions referred to are formulated here in terms of “marginal” magnitudes because 
they are obtained from functions which are assumed to be differentiable. But of course, each 
project is a discrete unit. This does not put in question the relevance of applying to such 
discrete units the optimality conditions stated above, for the following two reasons:  
 —  One  is  working  here  at  a  scale  where  each  project  is  small  with  respect  to  the  total 
investments involved;  
— If one thinks of solving the optimization problem that leads to (3) and (9) - (11) in terms of 
an  algorithm  of  gradual  adjustment of  the  variables  involved  towards  minimum  cost, 
with the adjustment operating in discrete real time, one can see the various projects as 
being stages of this algorithm. Each project, when adopted because the benefits it entails 
(the value of the damages it allows to avoid) are larger than its out of pocket cost, is to  be 
interpreted as a step towards this minimum. 
4°) Resource transfers between countries are advocated in the literature for moving from 
Nash equilibria to Pareto efficiency. While most often designed as lump sum transfers, 
they could instead be earmarked and exclusively devoted to adaptation and mitigation 
expenditures so as to have (3) and (9)-(11) satisfied. NORDHAUS  and YANG 2006 make 
proposals in that direction.       
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